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Abstract. This position paper first summarizes work done by the first
author on location privacy and differential privacy. These techniques will
help to solve privacy problems in decentralized mobile social networks,
which is the main theme of his PhD research. The paper then briefly
reviews the state-of-the-art in privacy-preservation of social graphs and
clarifies the lack of attention to graph sharing in decentralized setting.
Finally, some initial ideas on how to realize such soft decentralized access
controls are described.
1 Motivation
The prevalent architectures of social networks mainly rely on the central reposi-
tory of user data, so users must trade their privacy for free service. The central-
ized setting makes oﬄine data processing operations (e.g. publishing a anonymized
version of a social graph) easier and attracts a lot of interest in the security com-
munity. Parallel to this line of research, there also exists another line dedicated
to decentralized alternatives 1 in which users manage their own data and access
policies. Shifting from the free-service (centralized) paradigm to the user-centric
(decentralized) one should, in principle, increase user confidence or trust, but
understanding how to properly share information in this architecture remains a
huge challenge in user privacy preservation. For example, early efforts such as
Diaspora 2 and Persona [3] protect user privacy at the cost of less utility.
As a specific sub-problem, anonymizing social network data is more chal-
lenging [13] than anonymizing relational data. First, it is harder to model the
adversarial background knowledge. Vertex/edge labels, neighborhood graphs and
the like can be used to re-identify individuals, not only the conventional quasi-
identifiers. Second, to measure information loss in perturbed network data is
not easy because nodes and edges are not independent as items in tabular data.
Third, anonymization techniques in social network data usually ask for deeper
understanding of affects caused by a single graph modification. In decentralized
settings, those anonymization challenges may be exacerbated as we need the
collaboration of users to reach a global (noisy) view of the social graph.
1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison of software and protocols for distributed social networking
2
https://diasporafoundation.org/
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1.1 Thesis’s objectives
Privacy in social networks involves privacy requirements for identities, links, con-
tents, activities disclosure-resistance. The early vision of the PhD thesis is on
understanding intrinsic difficulties of decentralized mobile social networks and to
propose mechanisms for privacy-preserving data sharing (e.g. partial friend list
sharing). We aim to start with simple models with several assumptions about
the attacker’s knowledge and dynamics of networks. While there are many struc-
tural attacks in centralized setting [2], we witness little similar research on those
attacks in the decentralized one. One important reason may be due to the lack
of the global view of the social graph; hence we conjecture that there will be dif-
ferent attack scenarios. We seek for an appropriate combination of cryptography
and anonymization techniques to address the problem. Our ultimate objective
is to make significant contributions both theoretically and empirically to the
development of decentralized alternatives to the current online social networks
(OSN).
The two following subsections summarize two main contributions of the first
author in his master course. In each subsection, an anticipated application of
the corresponding technique will be presented.
1.2 Location Privacy
Anonymization methods (e.g. k-anonymity) are extensively used in location pri-
vacy with a typical configuration of a anonymizer between the LBS server and
mobile users. By cloaking user locations into bigger sets satisfying certain thresh-
olds, users’ true locations are concealed. Privacy in this setting means ”privacy
by blending yourself in a crowd”. MeshCloak [8] brings novelties in the cloaking
problem by leveraging the real street maps for cloaking purpose. It tries to solve
a harder problem of continuous queries which guarantees the privacy even in
consecutive queries. Compared to previous work on the same problem, it pro-
duces much smaller cloaking areas, so reducing the processing burden at the
LBS server. To formally quantify the privacy level of the new model, MeshCloak
takes into account the stronger attackers knowledge by modelling user moving
patterns based on time-homogeneous semi-Markov process with dwelling time
at states. Specifically, each user with historical traces and a moving speed has a
mobility profile. Under the assumption that the attacker may construct such mo-
bility profiles and mount maximum likelihood attacks, MeshCloak still achieves
high level of privacy (measured as high incorrectness of attacks).
Our technique and the anonymization methods applied to the publication of
whole social graphs [11] are similar in the sense of hiding by blending protected
objects into bigger sets. Meanwhile, existing techniques in [8] may help us in
problems related to dynamics in social networks (arrival/leave of nodes as well
as creation/deletion of links).
1.3 Differential Privacy
The second work [9] is on differential privacy [5], specifically applied to linear
counting queries [7]. Differential privacy is an in-focus paradigm for publishing
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useful statistical information over sensitive data with rigorous privacy guaran-
tees. It requires that the outcome of any analysis on database is not influenced
substantially by the existence of any individual (so the name differential). Differ-
ential privacy has been successfully applied to a wide range of data analysis tasks.
The comparative study [9] juxtaposes the state-of-the-art schemes and identi-
fies advantages/disadvantages of each one as well as proposes improvements for
better scalability and lower injected noise.
With strong theoretical foundations, differential privacy is a promising tool
for formulating and solving certain privacy issues in both centralized/decentralized
and oﬄine/online settings for data publication within social networks [11].
2 Privacy Preservation of Social Graphs
Social graphs considered in the state-of-the-art vary in a wide range, from un-
labeled, simple, undirected ones to data-rich ones. This section reviews a few
typical privacy-preserving techniques in centralized and decentralized settings.
2.1 Centralized setting
There is a large body of work focusing on how to share social graphs owned by or-
ganizations without revealing the identities or links between users involved. The
existing anonymization methods fall into four main categories. The methods of
first category provide k-anonymity by deterministic edge additions or deletions,
assuming attacker’s background knowledge regarding some property of its target
node. The second category includes random additions, deletions and switches of
edges to prevent the reidentification of nodes or edges. The methods falling in
the third category assign probabilities to edges to add uncertainty to the original
graph. Finally, the fourth class of techniques cluster together nodes into super-
nodes of size at least k. Note that the last two classes of schemes induce possible
world models, i.e., we can retrieve graph samples that are consistent with the
anonymized output graph.
2.2 Decentralized setting
Decentralized social networks consist of federated and distributed models. In
distributed setting, the social graph is split between many holders, and even
between users in which each node only knows his friends. To privately aggregate
the global graph, we need collaborative privacy-preserving sharing mechanisms.
Unfortunately, not much attention has been given to this topic except in a few
works, for example [10]. In tabular data aggregation, the distributed sharing
problem seems easier and exposes a lot of efficient mechanisms, e.g. [1].
As we aim at mechanisms for decentralized social networks, the access control
on network data is of importance. One of our concerns is how to devise “soft” ac-
cess policies via collaborative anonymization. An anticipated scenario, presented
in the next section, is that given different trust levels between a user and his
friends, the user adds different noises to his true friend list before transmitting
them to his neighbors.
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3 Ongoing Work
At the early stage of the thesis, we survey the state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving
methods in decentralized social networks as well as in the centralized ones.
Privacy protection techniques can be classified roughly as cryptography-based
and anonymization-based. Cryptographic primitives support a wide range of
OSN-related operations like encryption to a group, group key revocation with
attribute-based encryption (ABE) [3], searching on encrypted data, secure mul-
tiparty computation. However, this set of solutions incur unavoidable trade-off
between secrecy, performance and complexity. Anonymization techniques while
avoiding costly encryption may have other intricacies in designing online proto-
cols, e.g. protocol for establishing a trust relationship, controlling the boundary
of shared data (even in noisy forms). In addition, new protocols in our models
require deliberate choice of replication schemes and consistency models.
Fig. 1: Autonomous sharing of friend lists with trust-based soft access control
We propose initial ideas of autonomous relationship sharing (highly sensitive
data) via trust-based access control. Fig. 1 depicts the sharing model under the
assumption of Clone2Clone-like [6] distributed social networks. Each mobile user
possesses one clone in the cloud for high availability and may allow the clone to
perform actions on behalf of him. We assume an overlay trust network [4] between
users to guide the sharing activity. Intuitively, each user determines the amount
of noise added to his true friend list based on the trust levels (fairness) to a
friend and then sends out the noisy friend list. The friend list should get noisier
(monotonicity) as propagating within the network. Our goal is to allow each
user to get friend lists from many sources, directly or indirectly, and to properly
reconstruct the (noisy) global graph for his own purposes. An interesting question
is how to guarantee the convergence of information in aggregated graph. We may
start with several metrics such as randomness [12] and apply mining techniques
for uncertain graphs to quantify the remaining utility in the graph.
4 Conclusion
Parallel to the success of centralized social network services based on the freemium
model, decentralized alternatives have also been proposed as a response from the
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research community in order to better address privacy concerns of users. Follow-
ing this direction, our methodology is to see first the big picture of decentralized
social networks by studying their challenges and opportunities. We then aim to
formalize problems of moderate size that can be stated and solved efficiently us-
ing both tools in cryptography and anonymization. One such in-focus problem
is the collaborative and autonomous relationship sharing in cloud-based peer-
to-peer architectures.
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